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UID:pretalx-ethereum-zurich-2026-FPR7ZV@cfp.ducttape.events
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20260410T114000
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DESCRIPTION:On high-throughput\, low-fee blockchains\, a qualitatively new 
 form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit larg
 e volumes of speculative transactions\, whose profitability is resolved on
 ly at execution time. We refer to this as spam MEV. On major rollups\, it 
 can at times consume more than half of block gas\, even though only a smal
 l fraction of probes ultimately results in a trade. Despite growing awaren
 ess of this phenomenon\, there is no principled framework for understandin
 g how blockchain design parameters shape its prevalence and impact.\n\nWe 
 develop such a framework\, modeling spam transactions competing for on-cha
 in opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits
  to zero\, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block ca
 pacity\, minimum gas price\, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical 
 evidence from Base and Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as b
 lock capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduc
 ed. Our analysis yields three main insights. First\, spam is always costly
 : when block capacity is scarce\, it displaces users and drives up gas pri
 ces\; as block capacity grows\, it increasingly consumes execution resourc
 es\, raising network externality\, i.e.\, the cost of provisioning and pro
 cessing blocks. We show that spam takes an increasing share of each additi
 onal unit of block capacity\, so capping it before all users are included 
 creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eli
 minates disproportionate spam and externality. Second\, we extend the anal
 ysis to priority fee ordering and show that ordering transactions by gas p
 rice helps reduce spam\, as spammers must pay more to reach early block po
 sitions. Third\, as user demand grows and blockspace is scaled accordingly
 \, spam's share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitel
 y.
DTSTAMP:20261013T182915Z
LOCATION:Limmat (Y15-G-60)
SUMMARY:Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughp
 ut Blockchains - Lioba Heimbach
URL:https://cfp.ducttape.events/ethereum-zurich-2026/talk/FPR7ZV/
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