Ivan Homoliak
Ivan is currently an associate at the Brno University of Technology and he focuses on applied research in the area of system security. Ivan is interested in designing, implementing, and optimizing novel systems and solutions, emphasizing system security. In particular, Ivan focuses on blockchain-based authentication schemes, consensus protocols, electronic voting in blockchains, decentralized iden
Sessions
Ethereum's Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol cannot technically verify whether validators execute full block validation before issuing attestations, enabling application of the Verifier's Dilemma (VD): skipping validation reduces operating costs and eliminates the risk of late attestation penalties, while yielding nearly identical rewards. We formalize this tension using evolutionary game theory and the replicator equation, modeling competition among three validator phenotypes: compute honestly (CH), follow majority (FM) as a lazy variant, and join pool w. compute conditionally or follow majority (JPCC & JPFM). With realistic operational costs (approximately 20% of rewards for a full node versus 4% for a reduced node), our slot-level simulations show that FM consistently outperforms CH in profit, and that pool-based lazy strategies (JPFM) form an evolutionarily stable equilibrium that rapidly concentrates the validator population into a single shared pool, eroding decentralization. We discuss protocol-level mitigations and directions for future work.
This talk explores the evolving foundations of scalable, secure, and decentralized blockchains through the lens of SNARK‑ification, quantum‑resistant design, Layer‑1 scalability, and novel consensus ideas such as proof‑of‑useful‑work.